Publications
‘Blame and the Humean Theory of Motivation’
Philosophia 45, 2017: pp. 1345 - 64
A classic, though basically neglected question about motivation arises when we attempt to account for blame’s nature—namely, does the recognition central to blame need help from an independent desire in order to motivate the blame-characteristic dispositions that arise in the blamer? Those who have attended to the question think the answer is yes. Hence, they adopt what I call a Humean Construal of blame on which blame is (a) a judgment that an individual S is blameworthy and (b) an independent desire about S not doing as they did or being as they are. This paper rejects arguments for the Humean Construal, illustrates deep failings of that view, and uses these considerations to support anti-Humean accounts of blame in particular and moral motivation more broadly.
‘Debt Relief: On Haji’s Reason’s Debt to Freedom’,
Polish Journal of Philosophy 7, 2015: pp. 111 - 130.
This is a writing that bugs me. I wrote it when I was young. I also should’ve been clearer and more reasonable. My main concern is that a key premise in Haji’s primary argument lacks support. Haji purports that the premise is supported by his a well-known case in normative psychology focused on the existence of reasons. Haji takes the case to show that the objective ought is the morally significant ought. I point out that the case alone does not show that the objective ought is the morally significant ought, and many philosophers including the one who originally published the case agree on the grounds that the case leaves open a reasonable route to the conclusion that the subjective ought is the morally significant ought.
Haji goes on to attempt to wield the result that the objective ought is the morally significant ought against all compatibilist theories of free will/moral responsibility. I should’ve simply said that each of those arguments remains unsupported because they rely for their justification on an unsupported and extremely controversial claim.
Haji responds. Haji argues that (a) I’m merely pointing out that the case is ambiguous between the objective and subjective reading and (b) reasserts without argument that the case shows that the objective ought is the morally significant ought.
Haji is incorrect about (a) and, so, his reassertion remains without warrant.
‘As Long As We’ve Got Each Other',
Asteriskos: International Journal of International and Peace Studies 1, 2006: pp. 99 - 116.
This is a super early paper of mine. As such, it’s not great. I argue that shared history is a problematic reason for caring more about one’s compatriots than one’s non-compatriots. To show this, I appeal to the metaphysics of time. (yikes : ))